1999 Kargil Conflict
This is my entry for the American Foreign Service’s Diplomacy Essay contest. Thank you to Ms. Messinger and Mr. Kohl for their guidance and for introducing me to this little – seen aspect of international relations.
1999 Kargil Conflict
Diplomacy can be an event but more often than not, it is an evergreen process. Relationships and rapport, an understanding of each party’s point of view and priorities, is developed over time. The U.S. has invested significant time learning about and understanding nuances across various cultures and historically embedded priorities.
A ticking nuclear catastrophe
The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is widely quoted as an event when the World came the closest it has ever to nuclear war and annihilation. Much less discussed is the nuclear standoff in 1999 between India and Pakistan. The regional bloc alliances (Russia and Israel with India, China and the Arabs with Pakistan), calamitous stakes and factors at play amplified concerns about the global aftermath of this standoff.
What makes the ensuing American diplomatic intervention exemplary, is in how it all boiled down to one meeting that prevented nuclear war, and entrenched American credibility in the world as a fearless peacebuilder.
The incursion of Pakistani armed forces across the Indian Line of Control at Kargil in Spring 1999 constituted the basis of this conflict between these nuclear-powered adversaries. Pakistan’s objective was to sever the supply links between Kashmir and Ladakh and cause Indian forces to withdraw from the Siachen Glacier, forcing India to negotiate a settlement of the broader Kashmir dispute. However, what started as an incursion, threatened to expand to a full-blown and possibly nuclear conflict, with India refusing to negotiate under the threat of aggression and instead launching an extensive effort to recapture the territories.
Not only did Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif face intense local political pressure to maneuver an upper hand against India but unbeknownst to him, he also lacked control over Pakistan’s military.
Amid growing international condemnation of Pakistan for having started the conflict, Sharif was also aware of the collateral damage facing Pakistan if India escalated the conflict into an all-out war. Worried for his personal safety as well, Sharif requested to meet President Clinton on July 4th, 1999. The U.S. Administration understood that Sharif had brought his family with him to the States, for fear of not being able to return to Pakistan with a deal, that was seen as favorable for Pakistan.
President Clinton and his team now had the difficult objective of convincing Pakistan to withdraw its troops from across the border (a precondition from India for negotiations and de-escalation), while also ensuring Prime Minster Sharif’s political survival in Pakistan.
Where appeasement doesn’t work, a reality check often helps
In the spirit of keeping tensions low in the region, the United States had unsuccessfully tried (1998) through diplomatic channels to appease and dissuade Pakistan from testing nuclear weapons. Given the high stakes now with Kargil, the United States employed everything in its diplomatic toolbox to temper down the conflict. When the back-channel diplomatic outreach to Pakistan failed, the United States did not take a neutral stand this time, but publicly called out Pakistan as the aggressor, while asking India to exercise restraint as well.
The U.S. administration also warned Pakistan that a $100 million International Monetary Fund loan would be held up if Pakistan did not pull back personnel to pre-conflict Line of Control border.
Reality-checks communicated by friends are even more effective. The United States also leveraged influence of friends and Pakistan’s known allies, with British PM Tony Blair, Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan as well as Pakistan’s ally, China all weighing in heavily on the issue with Prime Minister Sharif before his meeting with President Clinton.
In the meeting with President Clinton, Sharif was informed that unbeknownst to him, the Pakistani military was preparing nuclear missiles for deployment against India, which would be sure to retaliate in kind and it was anyone’s guess before nuclear war began. President Clinton also emphasized how the current situation could have catastrophic consequences for the region. President Clinton further exerted pressure by indicating that the U.S. would not dither from a press release indicating that the U.S. had exercised a lot of patience with Pakistan’s harboring and supporting of terrorists and that Pakistan, despite being in a precarious situation, was seeking nuclear war.
The above multi-pronged strategy proved effective and the American diplomatic team prevailed in getting Sharif to de-escalate tensions and ask his troops to return to the defacto Line of Control.
Diplomacy as an enabler
While this event is looked upon as an instance of powerful and decisive diplomacy, I believe it should also stand out as a beacon more so for how diplomacy influenced future policy not only in South Asia since, but also across the world.
Diplomacy saved the day in Kargil, but it also laid bare the need for consistent and long-term investment not only in local relationships, but also entire regions. Additionally, because difficult situations and crises can crop up unexpectedly, diplomatic tools should also have the ability to maneuver as rapidly, without being hampered by long-drawn legislative hurdles. Kargil emphasized like no other scenario till then, that a new toolkit was needed; one that permitted ongoing monitoring and continual review - a well-balanced toolkit that promoted regional development, while also establishing clear guardrails of what was not acceptable to the international community and the U.S.
The invoking of the Pressler Amendment in 1990, and of the Glenn Amendment and Symington Amendment sanctions in 1998 were well-intentioned in meaning to be punitive but had the wrong effect. These sanctions withheld economic aid and impacted the citizens of Pakistan and materially weakened the civilian and political infrastructure in the country, creating an environment ripe for the military under General Musharraf to violate the Line of Control in Kargil and mobilize nuclear weapons, without the civilian government's knowledge or authorization. The subsequent imposition of additional economic sanctions under Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1999, further drew Pakistan away from constructive dialogue.
The cuts in direct aid reduced America's role and involvement in the region’s development and growth. Such investments have been known to encourage citizen welfare through education, improved nutrition, and healthcare along with longer-term political stability. It is thus not a complete coincidence that the nuclear stand-off in the 1990s coincided with what was probably the period of lowest economic assistance from the United States to Pakistan or India.
The significant spike in U.S economic assistance to both countries in the aftermath of the stand-off (further motivated by the U.S.' increase in aid to Pakistan after 9/11), shows that the folly was recognized and changes were made to accelerate greater involvement in effecting positive change at a regional level.
There has also been a recognition that economic assistance should be focused in ways that have the greatest long-term impact. To that end, the focus of the aid has shifted a little from the traditional areas towards a continued thrust to provide technical assistance to local Partners, which would help develop human capital and thus value at the grass-roots level.
While aid to both countries has tapered since the early 2000s, the change has been more pronounced for India which has emphasized greater engagement with the United States in trade and declared in 2017 of having become a net donor of aid to countries.
U.S. diplomacy has been an indispensable toolkit for world peace and the Brownback II and Ackerman Amendments adjusted the approach of future diplomatic efforts in South Asia, which allow continued developmental efforts in the region while allowing the United States to still react quickly with decisive measures if the situation called for it.
Works Cited
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*Mall, Rishima. “Interview with Wing Commander Asish Vohra, Indian Air Force (Retired).” 4 Feb. 2021.
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Pandey, Shubhangi. “U.S. Sanctions on Pakistan and Their Failure as Strategic Deterrent.” ORF Issue Brief, no. 251, Aug. 2018.
*Riedel, Bruce. “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House.” Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, 2002.
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*Talbott, Strobe. “The Day A Nuclear Conflict Was Averted.” The Day A Nuclear Conflict Was Averted | YaleGlobal Online, 13 Sept. 2004, yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/day-nuclear-conflict-was-averted.
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*“U.S. Foreign Aid by Country.” FAE: Dashboard, U.S Aid, explorer.usaid.gov/cd/IND.
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*United States, Congress, Cong. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 2008. 110th Congress, 1st session, document 45-127 pdf.
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